Works" and "Russell's Notes on Frege for Appendix a of The Principles of Mathematics", this completes the publication of all notes on Frege in the Archives. 2 The first twenty-two leaves of notes consist of a transcription of a number of theorems and proofs from the Grundgesetze into Russell's notation, beginning with the first theorem at §53 and continuing through to §144 on page 181 of the first volume, 57 pages short of the last section. (The final leaf of these notes was found on the verso of a leaf of notes on Alexius Meinong that Russell made in preparation for writing one of his reviews of Meinong's work.
3 ) The next four leaves of notes list the principal results of the whole of Volume ii, but appear to have been added later. The final three pages of "Other Notes on Grundgesetze, Vol. ii" were found on a single folded leaf in Russell's copy of the Grundgesetze when Russell's library was received by the Archives. 4 Four additional half-leaves found in that copy contain notes on the Grundlagen der Arithmetik. 5 The bulk of the notes seem to have been written beginning in June 1902. The second volume reached Russell by February 1903, but after he had composed the appendix for The Principles of Mathematics. 6 Although there is no reference to the notes in Russell's correspondence, they can be dated from internal evidence, in particular by the notation he used at various times in this period.
i. background of the notes
It was only after substantially completing the Principles in 1902 that Russell studied the works of Gottlob Frege and discovered the extent to which Frege had anticipated his project of reducing mathematics to logic. 7 In the Preface to the Principles, Russell writes:
In Mathematics, my chief obligations, as is indeed evident, are to Georg Cantor and Professor Peano. If I had become acquainted sooner with the work of Professor Frege, I should have owed a great deal to him, but as it is I arrived independently at many results which he had already established.
(PoM, p. xviii)
After finishing the body of the Principles in May 1902, Bertrand Russell turned to a review of the literature on the subject with the intention of adding scholarly references in the proofreading process. This review began in June and included the works of Frege. On 16 June Russell wrote the famous letter to Frege, announcing the paradox and beginning a correspondence (SLBR, 1: 245-6). At the same time Russell studied papers by Frege and the logical works, Begriffsschrift and Grundgesetze der Arithmetik. The reading resulted in several changes to the Principles in proof, and the addition of Appendix a, "The Logical and Arithmetical Doctrines of Frege", which was completed in November 1902. In that Appendix Russell discusses only the introductory and philosophical issues in the Grundgesetze and remarks of the formal presentation that:
In the Grundgesetze der Arithmetik, various theorems in the foundations of cardinal Arithmetic are proved with great elaboration, so great that it is often very difficult to discover the difference between successive steps in a demonstration.
(PoM, p. 519)
The question arises of just how carefully Russell read Frege's technical work, and what impact it had on Russell's own project. It is clear that Russell did find that Frege had not only anticipated many of his results in the Principles, but also had much to teach him about carrying out the logicist programme. In the Preface to Principia Mathematica, in 1910, Whitehead and Russell write:
In all questions of logical analysis, our chief debt is to Frege. Where we differ from him, it is largely because the contradictions showed that he, in common with all other logicians, ancient and modern, had allowed some error to creep into his premisses; but apart from the contradictions, it would have been almost impossible to detect this error. In Arithmetic and the theory of series, our whole work is based on that of Georg Cantor.
(PM, 1: viii)
The notes transcribed here are among the results of Russell's reading of Frege in 1902 and show the care with which Russell attended to the logical details of the Grundgesetze der Arithmetik, as well as providing evidence of what Russell and Whitehead learned from Frege about "logical analysis".
ii. content of the notes
The notes follow the principal theorems of the first volume of the Grundgesetze, beginning with Part 〈. 8 The main result of Part 〈 is theorem 32, what has come to be known as "Hume's Principle": if there is a one-to-one function mapping u onto v, then the number of u's is the same as the number of v's. 9 Theorem 32 is the end of a series of lemmas, beginning with theorem 1: a is f if and only if a is in the course of values of f.
Russell transcribed these theorems into his own notation, using occasional borrowings from Frege, and copied selected lines from the proofs, again translating them. Russell's notation is generally adequate to translate Frege's, although around the notions of ancestral and number series he had to introduce some new defined expressions. Russell seems to have slipped in representing the logical structure of some of the lines of the 8 The Parts and section numbers are: 〈 ( § §53-65), 〉 ( § §66-87), ⌫ ( § §88-95), ⌬ ( § §96-101), ⌭ ( § §102-7), ⌮ ( § §108-13), ⌯ ( § §114-19), ⌰ ( § §120-1), ⌱ ( § §122-57), ⌲ ( § §158-71), and ⌳ ( § §172-9).
9 Actually "Hume's Principle" is generally taken to be the biconditional rather than just this one direction.
proof of theorem 1 on the first leaf of notes, but that error was not repeated, and the rest of the notes seem to be a fair, though sometimes selective, reporting of the proofs.
The main result of Part 〉 is theorem 71: the successor relation is one to one. The proof occupies Frege from §66 to §87, over twenty-seven pages, but Russell devoted less than one leaf to it, merely stating the result and transcribing a few lines of the proof without citation. The proofs of various results about the natural numbers 0 and 1 and the successor relation following in Parts ⌫, ⌬ and ⌭ are skipped, with just some of the results stated, again without citation.
With Part ⌮ at §108 the notes are more careful, with theorems identified more clearly by number and with intermediate lines marked with the lower-case Greek letters that Frege uses for his lemmas. The principal result of ⌮ is theorem 145, that no number follows itself in the number series. Here Russell notes Frege's definition of the ancestral of a relation, remarking that it is "giving a new view of mathematical induction". This remark clearly marks his appreciation of its role in giving a logical analysis of induction, by providing a way of defining the ancestral of the successor relation and thus the number series. 10 The next major theorem that Russell notes is 155, that "the number of finite numbers up to and including b is b + 1". This is a key step in proving that every number has a successor, one of Peano's axioms. Russell does not indicate when Frege has proved each of Peano's axioms in Volume i, but Frege himself does not remark on this in the Grundgesetze either. 11 With Part ⌱ Russell's notes are more detailed, copying and noting almost every line of proofs by theorem and section number. Part ⌱ is devoted to "The proof of various propositions about Endlos". "Endlos" is 10 Russell's first appreciation of the definition of ancestral is included in his notes on the Begriffsschrift , transcribed in "Russell's Notes on Frege for Appendix a of the Principles ", pp. 159-61.
11 The "theory of finite numbers" is restricted to one chapter (xiv) in the middle of the Principles , and the work is not organized around proving them from logical principles, then constructing the rest of mathematics from that, as would be contemporary order. Russell only briefly states the axioms: "(1) 0 is a number. (2) If a is a number, the successor of a is a number. (3) If two numbers have the same successor, the two numbers are identical. (4) 0 is not the successor of any number. (5) If s be a class to which belongs 0 and also the successor of every number belonging to s , then every number belongs to s. The last of these propositions is the principle of mathematical induction" (p. 125).
Frege's name for the cardinal of the natural numbers. Russell writes this as ␣ 0 , using Ꭽ 0 in a shaky hand only in the last few leaves of notes written later than 1902. The proof of theorem 207 takes up seven leaves of notes. Russell's transcription has it that if the cardinal number of u is ␣ 0 then there is a many-one relation R such that the ancestral of R is nonreflexive, u is included in the range of R, and there is some x such that the u's are the objects in the range of the ancestral of R starting with x. In other words, a set with the same cardinality as the natural numbers can be arranged in a series satisfying the Peano axioms.
One leaf then follows for the proof of theorem 263, "the converse of (207)". Richard Heck describes 263 as tantamount to proving that, "all 'simply infinite systems'-that is, structures which satisfy the DedekindPeano axioms-are isomorphic", a result proved less formally by Dedekind in Was sind und was sollen die Zahlen? in 1887. 12 Russell does not follow this proof in detail, remarking that several symbolizations are "approximate" and concluding that "the proof occupies 20 pages". The notes on Volume i end with §158 and §172 on folio 23 of the notes. This leaf reappeared as the verso of a leaf of notes on Meinong. When Russell received Volume ii, he began the new notes with a remark on both §158 and §172 of Volume i at the top of a new leaf foliated again as 23, here indicated as 23 2 . This is evidence that there was a gap between the writing of the notes, in addition to the evidence from the new notation in the second group.
What follow are three leaves of notes on Volume ii which pick out the principal results and lemmas to the end of the volume. 13 One final, unnumbered leaf summarizes the axioms and rules of inference from §48 in Volume i, using a notation that places it later than the rest of the notes. The concluding "other notes" cover exactly the same portions of Volume ii, but differ in many small points of notation. They are presumably the result of a first pass through the volume, and were rewritten to join the larger manuscript. iii. russell's notation 14 The notation in the notes is based on that of Peano. Russell's additions to that notation by 1902 are presented in several articles, including two in Peano's journal, Revue de Mathématiques, which have been translated as "The Logic of Relations with Some Applications to the Theory of Series" and "General Theory of Well-Ordered Series". 15 The following selections from those articles include many of the symbols in the notes.
x has the relation R with y.
If R is a relation, can be called the domain of the relation R , that is to say, the class of terms which have that relation with a single term, or with several terms.
Thusx is the class of y such that R relates x to y, and x is the class of y such that R relates y to x. standing alone signifies the range of R. For a relation S the domain and range will be and, similarly for N (the successor relation) with and, and so on. The comes from Peano, where it is a function symbol applying to x to give x, the singleton class containing x. The inverted iota, , later the symbol for a definite description, serves here as the inverse of . If x is the unique element of the singleton y, then y is just x. Russell uses 1' for identity and 0' for 14 As several of Russell's symbols involve single quotation marks, in what follows I will use symbols ambiguously as names for themselves, and allow the reader to sort out which are cases of use and which of mention. non-identity:
Note. This symbol is given the notation of Schröder. I do not use the symbol = for the identity of individuals, since it has another usage for the equivalence of classes, of propositions, and of relations.
The notions of many-one (Nc→1) and one-one (1→1) relations are defined next:
Note. Nc→1 is the class of many-one relations. The symbol Nc→1 indicates that, if we have xRy, when x is given, there is only one possible y, but that, when y is given, there is some cardinal number of x's which satisfies the condition xRy. Similarly, 1→Nc is the class of the converses of many-one relations, and 1→1 is the class of one-one relations.
(Papers 3: 319)
In these notes Russell uses ʵ for sentential conjunction in the notes with ∧ used for the notion of intersection it expresses in these earlier papers. 5 1 thus defines Nc→1 as the relations R such that if x is related by R to y and z then y is identical with z. In a new section on cardinal numbers, Russell defines the relation of similarity:
This should be read as saying that if u and v are classes, then they are similar if and only if there is a one-to-one relation R such that u is included in the domain of R and the range of R is the whole of v. Gregory Moore reports that Russell used ʳ for class inclusion as well as implication until March or April 1902, when he started to use ʲ for class inclu-sion. Thus u ʳ here means that u is included in . 16 In the second paper, "General Theory of Well-Ordered Series", published in 1902, Nc'u , the cardinal number of a class u, is defined as well as the relation of being the cardinal number of, Nc, from which it is derived:
Nc is the relation which u bears to w when w is the class of classes v similiar to u, so Nc'u is the class of classes v which are similar to u. This is Russell's version of the "Frege-Russell definition" of cardinal number. 18 The notion is also described in the earlier paper, but not explicitly defined. 19 Some of Russell's notation for relations has become standard:
It is necessary to distinguish R 1 ʵ R 2 , which signifies the logical product, from R 1 R 2 , which signifies the relative product.… For example, grandfather is the relative product of father and father or of mother and father, but not of father and mother.
When Russell encountered Frege's definition of the ancestral of a relation, his notation for it was consequently "R N ". The rest of the notation is either defined in the notes or will be explained in the annotation as it appears.
In his notes on the Grundgesetze Russell uses Frege's numbering for the theorems (in parentheses to the right, as in (155) for theorem 155). Russell also follows Frege's annotation of lemmas by Greek letters in 16 Papers 3: xiv. This notation makes sense. If u ʳ means that if something is in u then it is in , this is a way of saying that u is a subset of . Russell reads R ʳ 0' as R is contained in diversity or irreflexive. R ʳ 1' will mean that R is reflexive.
17 "General Theory of Well-Ordered Series", Papers 3: 408-9. 18 Moore suggests that Russell was led to this definition by reading a paper by Peano from 1901 which rejected such a proposal. Peano had encountered the definition when writing his 1895 review of Frege's Grundgesetze (Papers 3: xxvii).
19 "The Logic of Relations", Papers 3: 321.
parentheses: (␣), (␤), (␥), etc. The use of inference rules is marked with the symbols "ʳ :" at the beginning of a line, sometimes only followed by the consequent in a series of conditionals which derive results from a repeated group of premisses as antecedents.
iv. russell's representation of frege's notation
Very little of Frege's notation appears in the notes. Russell either had notation ready or created it as needed. Some of Frege's symbols do appear, however. Folio 1 includes the content stroke in the subformula − f (a ) = b at line 9 and following. Line 18 of that leaf is a statement of Frege's first theorem, (1), which Russell symbolizes as:
, where ʵ expresses membership in a course of values. Folio 4, line 8 introduces Part 〉, − I f, that f, the successor relation ("following in the number series directly after") is many-one ("eindeutig"). Russell glosses this as N ⑀ Nc→1. Folio 2 simply transcribes Frege's definition of >, the "mapping" relation between concepts. In use, Russell translates it with his way of expressing the fact that a relation is one-one and "onto". Thus the main result of Part 〈, theorem 32:
(with Frege's symbol for the converse of a relation replaced by −1 , and the conditional stroke replaced with an arrow) comes out as:
Russell's version asserts that if there is a one-to-one mapping R with u as its domain and v as its range, then the cardinal number of u is equal to the cardinal number of v.
As Russell introduces new notation in the course of the notes, it can occur that some expressions from Frege have two different notations. Part ⌯ proves theorem 155 (again approximating Frege's font):
Russell's initial representation of this is:
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at the end of the proof. N N ʴ 1' for the "weak ancestral" of the successor relation becomes N ′ by a convention adopted immediately after the first statement, but Nc'( N b b )Nb becomes bN (Nc'′ b ) without remark. 20 Since N is the successor relation and so is its domain, by the abbreviation Russell adopts on folio 8, ′ will be its "weak" ancestral, i.e. precedes or is identical with. 
v. text of the notes
The notes from ra1 230.030420-f1 are on twenty-six leaves measuring 17.5 cm × 22.5 cm. The first twenty-five leaves are numbered 1 to 25 in the upper right-hand corner, and have "Frege" in the upper left-hand corner, except for 1, which has "Frege, Grundgesetze d. Arithmetik. p. 74 ff.", and 24 and 25, which have "Frege. Gg. Vol. ii." to the left. The last leaf is unnumbered and has "Frege. Gg i. p. 61" in the upper left corner. The extra folio 23 from the notes on Meinong in file ra1 230. 030450 is consistent with the first 22. Russell may have left it on a stack of notepaper and decided that two brief lines were not enough to justify using a whole leaf. When he received Volume ii and started the next notes, he simply repeated the last two theorems of Volume i and started with the new volume.
Notes are on the recto of each leaf, except for short notes on the verso of 3 and 9. The final three pages of notes comprise one folded leaf, the right-and left-hand sides of one side, and the left-hand side alone of the verso. They were found in Russell's copy of the Grundegesetze when it was received at the Russell Archives. Four foliated half-leaves of notes on Grundlagen were also found, with notes on the recto of each and two lines on the verso of the last.
The symbols used can date the main body of notes, based on Moore's presentation of "The Evolution of Russell's Logical Symbolism" in Papers 3 (pp. xliii-xlvii ). Russell used Schröder's symbol 1' for identity between 1901 and 1904. From May 1902 to March 1903 Russell used "a v b for the union of classes a and b, but a ʴ b for 'a or b' if a and b were propositions; similarly he used a ∧ b for the intersection of classes a and b" (3: xlv ). This practice seems to have been followed in the notes.
The three leaves 23 to 25 have numerous changes to the notation, suggesting that they were composed later than folios 1 to 22. These include the use of a very awkwardly drawn Ꭽ 0 rather than ␣ 0 for the cardinal of the set of natural numbers, a change in the direction of the quotation mark from Nc'v to Nc'v, for example, and the accompanying adoption of Frege's notation with the smooth breathing accent over a variable to indicate classes, so that s ' (… s …) replaces s {… s …} as it would be in ⑀ 1 to 22. In addition folios 23 to 24 differ stylistically, including page references in the left margin and the use of Frege's assertion sign for theorems, both practices missing in 1 to 22. These features place them in 1903. 21 The next, unnumbered, leaf contains a number of symbols that date it later; the use of (x ) for the universal quantifier,x, C ) ( x, and f !x for propositional functions. The last was not in use until 1905, in "On Fundamentals" (Papers 4: 359-413).
The leaves of notes found in Russell's copy of Gg seem to be the result of a first reading of Volume ii. References to the same pages and definitions occur in the main body of notes, but with considerable alteration in the symbols. It is not possible to date the notes on Grundlagen, although they use Russell's notation "NC induct" for finite cardinal numbers and so date from after Russell's adoption of Peano notation.
vi. russell's notes
The notes are transcribed below, with each new leaf identifiable by the heading in the upper left-hand corner and a folio number 1 to 25 in the right, with the exception of the last, unnumbered leaf. Annotations are placed below a solid line keyed by angle-bracketed indices in the text. All comments in square brackets are Russell's. Editorial comments are also in angle brackets.
22 This is the main theorem of Part 〈, one direction of what has recently come to be known as "Hume's Principle": if there is a one-to-one relation R with domain u and range v , then the number of u 's is equal to the number of v 's. This series of theorems is completed with theorem 32, fol. 4, line 6. 23 Russell notes that this is not "exact", but it seems as close as Russell's notation will allow, and his antecedent and consequent are each logically equivalent to Frege's.
24 While (a) comes from the prefatory remarks in §53, with the next line Russell begins to follow the "Aufbau ", or Construction, in §55.
25 This line is Frege's ␤ and in Russell's notation ought to have a subscripted g on the ʳ, indicating universal quantification.
26 This is ␥. Russell has read ¬᭙ᒄ [ '
This mistake is repeated twice more, until it is ⑀ ⑀ silently corrected at 1: 12 ( ). It is not repeated later in the notes.
if ␤ is any class chosen out of domain of Q, ␣ is its correlative. i.e. if we put R for Q, ␣ =␤. Thus x > Ry . ≡ . x =y 〈Diagram on right side: two regions, u and v, an arrow to a dot "R u " in v from a dot in u, and a return arrow to a distinct point
Theorem 1 is a fairly immediate result, compared with what is to come. Perhaps because of the quantifier error above Russell does not follow the proof. This line is in Frege's notation. Russell's would be: f (a ) ≡ a ⑀ x f (x ). A simple instance of (1) would ⑀ put x (x~⑀ x ) for a and (x~⑀ x ) for f (x ), producing the paradox. Russell does ⑀ not remark on the paradox here or elsewhere in any of the marginalia, notes for Appendix a, or these notes on the Grundgesetze . 28 The definition of > q occurs at Gg §56, p. 76, between theorems 6 and 7.
Frege.
⑀ ⑀ (x, y ) (yQx ) =Q . ʳ : 〈Note directed to "yQx": "This is not an ⑀ exact rendering of Frege's meaning, but it is the best that can be done with Peano's notation."〉 〈30〉 aQr . ≡ . rQa : (
29 This is theorem 24, proved in §60. 30 Frege defines a double course of values for the extension of the converse of a relation, as the result of two monadic operations, thus: '
In the proof of theorem 22 Russell substitutes equivalent expressions in the context F , following Frege's rule, symbolizing Frege's "=" as "≡".
32 Lemma ⑀. Russell correctly interprets the combination of quantifier, conditional and negation which he mistook on folio 1. He gets it right in the rest of the notes.
33 Lemma from Gg §60, p. 83. The final "a " should be "x ". Russell mistakenly follows Frege's bound variables in the transcription, rather than his own.
Frege.
〈fol.〉 4
34 This seems to be Russell's speculation. There will be more than one many-one relations between classes, of course.
35 Russell stopped transcribing the proof with theorem 24, p. 83. Theorem 32 is proved at p. 86. His reference to "my Number 40" is unidentified.
36 The main theorem of Part 〉, proved at p. 86.
〈This section is deleted with a large X:〉 (a) To prove v = u u =v . uRb . R ⑀ 1→Nc . cRm . ʳ :. N d . dN N a . ʳ . a~N N a and 0~N N 0 
R N is defined as follows: [giving a new view of mathematical induction] 〈43〉
38 These "propositions about 0" come from ⌬ which begins at §96 (p. 127) and runs to p. 131. Russell's (a) is theorem 95. His (b) is not Frege's theorem 97, but an approximation to it. 39 The range of the successor relation is all numbers except for 0, a way of expressing Peano's axiom that 0 is not the successor of any number.
40 Propositions about 1 occupy ⌭, §102 to §107, pp. 131-6. Russell transcribes theorem 113: if the number of u is 1 then u is non-empty and theorem 110: 1 is the successor of 0. Russell's notation 0~N 0-0 is not the successor of itself-is not a theorem in Frege. However, theorem 114 says that only 1 is a successor of 0, which combined with 0 ≠ 1 (theorem 111) proves that result. Then follow theorem 117: if a and d are in a class with number 1 then a = d , and theorem 121: if whenever a and c are in u then a = c , then the number of u is 1. 41 The next two and a half leaves are devoted to Part ⌮, §108 to §113, pp. 137-44, proving theorem 145: no number which bears the ancestral of the successor relation to 0 also bears that relation to itself. That is, no natural number precedes itself in the number series.
42 Folio 6 concludes with theorem 126; 0 is not preceded by any number. 43 Russell remarks here on the connection between the ancestral of the successor relation and mathematical induction. Frege does not discuss induction, nor use it explicitly as a proof technique, although many times a property is shown to hold of all numbers by using the properties of ancestrals, which amounts to induction. 
ʳ . a~(R N ʴ 1')e : (137)? ʳ :. xRn ʳ x . a~(R N ʴ 1')x : mRn . eRm : ʳ . a~(R N ʴ 1')e :.
the number of finite numbers up to and including
No natural number follows itself in the number series (see Heck, pp. 277 and 284). 46 This is Part ⌯, §114- §19, ending with theorem 155, which Russell correctly reports as "the number of finite numbers up to and including b is b + 1". This is the crucial step in proving that every number has a successor (see Heck, p. 275). (152) ʳ :. 0N 
〈fol.〉 9
Propositions about ␣ 0 [p. 150 ff. ]. 〈47〉 ␣ 0 = Nc Df We have to prove ␣ 0~⑀ , which follows from ␣ 0 + 1 = ␣ 0 and (145) This results from sim . The proof is as follows: 〈fol.〉 10
Frege. 〈fol.〉 11
48~R N ʳ 1' means that R N is not "included in identity", i.e. R N is not reflexive. 49 Theorem 167 proves that Endlos is not a natural number.
To prove:
The seven leaves from 15 to 21 are devoted to the proof of theorem 207, stated in §128, p. 160, and proved finally in §143 on p. 178. Frege describes this theorem as: "Wenn Endlos die Anzahl eines Begriffes ist, so koennen die unter diesen Begriff fallenden Gegenstände in eine unverzweigte Reihe geordnet werden, die mit einem bestimmten Gegenstande anfängt und, ohne in sich zurückzukehren, endlos fortläuft" [ When Endlos is the number of a concept, then the objects falling under this concept can be ordered in an unbranching series, which begins with a given object and proceeds endlessly, without returning]. Russell's version has it that if the cardinal number of u is ␣ 0 then there is a many-one relation R such that the ancestral of R is included in "other", u is included in the range of R , and there is some x such that the u 's are the objects in the range of the ancestral of R starting with x .
〈fol.〉 16 §130. We have to proveȒ
xPm . mTc . cPa . ʳ . xPTPa : ʳ :. xPm : bQ y . ʳ y . mTy : bQc . cPa : ʳ . xPTPa :.
(␣) ʳ :. b = e . xPm : eQ y . ʳ y . mTy : bQc . cPa : ʳ . xPTPa :.
ʳ y . mTy : cPa . bQc : ʳ . d~Pb :. Hence by (15), after transformations,
We have to prove our series coextensive with u. Proof follows. 
Frege. 〈fol.〉 19 §138. We wish now to restrict the field ofPNP to u
Frege. 〈fol.〉 20 §140. We have to prove u (PNP ) generates an endless series. 
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Frege. 〈fol.〉 22 §144. 〈53〉 We have next to prove the converse of (207). If P, R be two such relations (i.e. two 's) we correlate − and −, and if x, y are correlated, we correlatex andy. We form a series of pairs, consisting of n and x n , where x n is the n +1th term of series. We define a pair (x ; y ) as R (xRy ). Also define
R xy (P Q)R wz . = . zQ y . wPx Df or R xy (P Q)R zw . = . zPx . wQ y Df Then the relation we want is R 0x (N P)′ R yz [This, considered as a relation of y and z, makes z the y +1th term in a series beginning with 53 This is theorem 263, the converse of 207. 54 The notation is Frege's ( §144, p. 179). 55 This leaf completes the notes on Gg i. Apparently Russell misplaced or lost this leaf, which shows up as the verso of a leaf of notes on Meinong made nearly two years later. When he received Volume ii Russell continued the notes with a new leaf foliated 23, repeating the last theorems of Volume i in the notation he was then using. The notation of the apparently lost folio 23 clearly matches that of the rest of the notes on Volume i. §172. Here the converse of above is to be proved.
[This takes 14 pp.]
Frege. 〈230.030420-f1 fol.〉 23 2 § §158, 172 prove :
The above Df is useful for powers of T: for we have n ⑀ No fin . ʳ . T n T T n + 1 and . T ← 'T = finite powers of T 
e. all relations less than R belong to u, but no relations greater than R do so. p. 189. : Won't explain big numbers. "If definition of each particular number affirmed a separate physical fact, one couldn't enough admire a man who can reckon with 9 figures." 〈71〉 Induction itself depends on arithmetic, through probability. Synthetic à priori Note, "synthetic" has vague meaning. Most useful: "Not deducible from logic alone". In this sense, detailed proof that arithmetic analytic. NC not a property of things: 1000 green leaves are each green, not each 1000. 2 books are 1 pair of books. Thus physical objects are not subjects of NC. NC not subjective or object of psychology anymore than the North Sea. NC and colour equally objective, but not equally properties of sensible objects. Objective ≠ palpable. If NC were subjective, there would be many 2's. NC not a presentation. NC not same as collection of objects which has a number; how about 0 and 1?
〈fol.〉 2
Opinions on 1. Is 1 a property of objects? "1 man" seems like "wise man". Taken this way, everything is one. Yet one is opposed to many. Numbers not obtained by abstraction: what shall we abstract from the moon to get 1? Or how get 0 this way? NC is asserted of a concept. "Venus has 0 moons" means "Venus's moons are a 0". "Kaiser's carriage is drawn by 4 horses" means "Horses drawing etc. are a 4." This removes an ambiguity of NC to be ascribed. E.g. book and pair of books. Existence also is to be asserted of a concept: same as denial of 0.
〈fol.〉 3
Numbers are objects, though not in space.
[Wrong] Definition of NC Take e.g. set of parallel lines. What is meant by saying they all have the same direction? Can define "direction of line a " as "all lines parallel to a ". Similiarly "shape of triangle ABC " is "all triangles similar to ABC ". Principle of abstraction. Two concepts "equinumerous" [similar] when 1→1 between terms under them. Nc'F = extension of concept "equinumerous with F ". Df 0 = Nc'(not equal to identical with itself ) Df 1 = Nc'(identical with 0) 
